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THE IDENTITIES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW: LESSONS FROM THE U.S. AND EU
REVOLUTIONS
ALEX MILLS*
This article, first presented as part of a conference entitled “What is
private international law?”, responds to this question through analysis of
four different “identities” through which private international law has
been viewed. It begins by exploring two contrasting classical approaches,
under which private international law is concerned with the international
ordering of state power, or with the national recognition of private rights.
It then turns to examine the US and EU private international law
“revolutions,” and the very different further identities of private
international law which have emerged as a consequence of each. After
reflecting critically on the experiences of these revolutions, the article
offers some concluding thoughts as to how the identity or identities of
private international law can or should be constructed, arguing that there
are valuable lessons and potentially propitious elements in each of the four
examined identities.
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INTRODUCTION
The question “what is private international law” – raised by the title of
the conference at which this article was first presented – could be
approached in a number of different ways. It might, for instance, invoke
consideration of what we decide to include within the subject, and what we
determine falls beyond its periphery;1 an increasingly difficult question in
the European Union as non-traditional regulatory mechanisms at least
functionally comparable to private international law rules have been
developed.2 It might similarly raise questions concerning whether private
international law should be viewed as a “subject” – a set of rules dealing
with cross-border private law relations – or as a “technique” for managing
the boundaries of normative systems which could potentially be brought to
bear on a range of other, perhaps analogous, problems.3 But there is also a
deeper challenge posed by the question, which is almost existential in
character – it asks what is the identity and purpose of private international
law; what is it for, what does it do? To ask these questions is really to ask
two different things. First, how does private international law see itself;
what is its “self-image,” representing its goals, ideals or aspirations?
Second, how does private international law look from the outside; what are
its “objective” characteristics, products, or effects? The reason it is
important to distinguish these two questions – which we might also call the
questions of the identities of private international law in theory and in
practice – is that the answers in each case may well be different, and this
may give rise to something of an “identity crisis,” as through the force of
the pressures created by this discrepancy private international law (in
theory and/or practice) undergoes a revolutionary transformation.
The focus of this article is on two traditional ideas of private

1. For the purposes of this article, private international law is understood to include rules on
jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Each of these
aspects of private international law has been transformed as part of the EU revolution; the analysis in
this article will be principally but not exclusively focused on choice of law, as it is the part of private
international law most affected by the U.S. private international law revolution.
2. For example, the “country of origin” principle. See generally ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE
OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 200 (2009); Ralf Michaels, The New European Choice
of Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607, 1625 (2008); Ralf Michaels, EU Law as Private International
Law? Reconceptualising the Country-of-Origin Principle as Vested-Rights Theory, 2 J. PRIVATE INT’L
L. 195 (2006); Geert De Baere, “Is this a conflict rule which I see before me?” Looking for a Hidden
Conflict Rule in the Principle of Origin as Implemented in Primary European Community Law and in
the “Directive on Electronic Commerce,” 11 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUR. & COMP. L. 287 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Karen Knop, Ralf Michaels & Annelise Riles, From Multiculturalism to Technique:
Feminism, Culture, and the Conflict of Laws Style, 64 STAN. L. REV. 589 (2012); Ralf Michaels and
Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of
Public International Law, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 349 (2012).
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international law, as well as two such “revolutions” in private international
law thinking – what they reacted against, how and why, and what we may
learn from each.4 The first is the U.S. revolution which was sparked by the
work of scholars such as Cavers5 and Currie6 in the middle of the twentieth
century, although in many ways it is still on-going or at least has thus far
proved inconclusive.7 The second is the EU revolution which was initiated
with the Brussels Convention of 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters,8 but which has accelerated
over the last decade or so. To describe these as revolutions is to highlight
that in each case, private international law undertook something of an
identity transformation. These phases of development were periods in
which in which the basic conceptions of the purposes of private
international law were shifted in a fundamental way, rather than periods in
which the details or techniques of private international law rules have been
reworked based on established foundations (as in, for example, the
evolutionary EU “upgrades” from the Brussels Convention to the Brussels I
Regulation,9 and from the Rome Convention on Choice of Law in
Contractual Obligations10 to its successor the Rome I Regulation11). To
borrow an expression from the philosophy of science, these are times in
which private international law underwent a paradigm shift.12
The premise of this article is that our understanding of the identities of
private international law may profit from a closer examination of the
experiences of both the U.S. and EU revolutions. The U.S. revolution
rightfully rejected the artifice of vested rights which had become
foundational to common law private international law in favor of policy-

4. This article aims to contribute to a growing literature considering and comparing
developments in the EU and United States, perhaps most notably Ralf Michaels, The New European
Choice-of-Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607 (2008).
5. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
7. See generally SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (2006).
8. 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (consolidated version), 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1, 3.
9. Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1.
10. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (consolidated version), 1998
O.J. (C 27) 34, 36.
11. Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6.
12. See Thomas S. Kuhn, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970); see
Michaels, supra note 2, at 1610; but see Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Revolution and the
European Evolution in Choice of Law: Reciprocal Lessons, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1741 (2008).
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oriented approaches, but (it is argued) went too far in its wholesale
adoption of a destructive and fragmenting anti-formalist critique inspired
by American legal realism. The EU revolution has, by contrast, largely
successfully revived traditional ideas of private international law within a
new federal context, but (it is argued) with a commitment to formalism and
narrowly defined objectives that carries its own unsatisfactory
consequences, including the obscuring of policy decisions and
consequences and the adoption of overly rigid rules precluding decisional
sensitivity to facts. There are lessons to be learned in both the contrasting
and shared experiences of these two revolutions, as well as from the
traditions they rejected.
I. THE OBJECTIVES OF “CLASSICAL” PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW
This section outlines two historical understandings of private
international law, which both put the later U.S. and EU experiences in
context, and to some extent have also informed their development. The
views are presented as strongly contrasting and even contradictory to
highlight their polarity, which is not to say that intermediate or hybrid
positions cannot be or have not been adopted.
A. International ordering of state power
The first perspective is that private international law is concerned with
state power. The clearest historical articulation of this approach was
provided by Savigny in the early part of the nineteenth century. He
identified private international law rules as responsive to the problem of
coexisting sovereign states and their legal orders. In his own (translated)
words:
It is the function of the rules of law to govern legal relations. But what is
the extent or sphere of their authority? What legal relations (cases) are
brought under their control?13
Which of the different local laws with which the legal relation in dispute
in any way comes in contact, is to be applied in the decision of the
question?14

Presented in this way, the essential function of private international

13. Friedrich Carl Von Savigny, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW – A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT
5 (William Guthrie trans., T. & T., Law Publishers 1869).
14. Id. at 17-18.

OF LAWS
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law is the allocation of regulatory authority between states. The function of
Savigny’s study of private international law was therefore declared to be:
To discover for every legal relation (case) that legal territory to which, in
its proper nature, it belongs or is subject (in which it has its seat).15
Savigny thus thought that each legal relation had a “natural” seat
(according to “its proper nature”) – but such dependence on an “intuited”
natural law framework was already suspect in the nineteenth century, and
few would find it convincing today.16 Later scholars and law-makers
working in this classical tradition have generally focused on developing
and evaluating further secondary criteria or objectives which might justify
a particular choice of law rule – the identification of the most appropriate
“connecting factor” (or factors) for each type of dispute.17 They have thus
focused on the way in which private international law should serve this
function – the principles according to which the regulatory authority of
states ought to be determined, or through which legal relationships should
be “localized.”18 These have traditionally included reliance on both
personal and territorial connections (recognizing community-based or
territory-based power or affiliation), as well as considerations of balancing
fairness to claimants and respondents, and balancing predictability and the
benefits of legal certainty against a flexibility which might lead to more
appropriate results in particular cases.19 This allocation of regulatory
authority is also carried out within a framework of public international law
rules which define the permitted grounds on which a state may assert
“jurisdiction” (as understood in public international law) – although this
public international dimension of private international law has not
15. Id. at 89.
16. But see Perry Dane, The Natural Law Challenge to Choice of Law, in D.E. CHILDRESS III,
THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010).
17. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
18. “Whether, for example, the legal effect of a given transaction ought to be tested by the lex
actus, the lex domicilii, or the lex fori, is a matter admitting of discussion, which ought to be discussed,
on intelligible grounds of principle.” – Albert Venn Dicey, On Private International Law as a Branch
of the Law of England, 6 L. QUARTERLY REV. 1, 17 (1890).
19. See, e.g., Catherine Kessedjian, Edward Ho, and Jacob van de Velden, International Civil
Litigation and the Interests of the Public, Report of the International Law Association, Sofia
Conference (2012) (noting the need for “rules which strike a fair balance between, on the one-hand, the
importance of safeguarding the legitimate interests of Defendants and, on the other, ensuring that no
injury is left without redress”), http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/D7AFA4C8-E599-40FEB6918B239B949698; Symeon C. Symeonides, Codification and Flexibility in Private International
Law, in GENERAL REPORTS OF THE XVIIITH CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF
COMPARATIVE LAW (K.B. Brown & D.V. Snyder eds., 2012); Mills, supra note 2, at 236; Peter Hay,
Flexibility Versus Predictability and Uniformity in Choice of Law: Reflections on Current European
and United States Conflicts Law, 226 RECUEIL DES COURS 281 (1991); see infra note 67 and
accompanying text.
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infrequently been obscured.20
Perhaps the most important secondary objective guiding the allocation
of regulatory authority of states under this perspective is the avoidance of a
conflict of legal orders. The three traditionally identified components of
private international law may each be viewed in this light as strategies to
minimize a possible conflict of laws – by reducing the situations in which
more than one state might assert jurisdiction, by attempting to ensure that
even if more than one state has jurisdiction they will each apply the same
substantive law,21 and by providing that a judgment obtained in one state is
at least presumptively considered determinative in other states, precluding
re-litigation. This emphasis on avoiding regulatory conflicts is both a
reflection of the interests of private parties who may suffer under
contradictory rules, as well as a recognition that such international ordering
is a strongly desirable feature of a lawful international community of states,
since in a principally horizontal international order such conflicts may
typically be resolvable, if at all, only through extra-legal exercises of
power.
B. National recognition of private rights
An opposing and contrasting perspective on private international law
is that the subject is not concerned with state power but with private rights.
This approach had its origins in the Dutch private international law school
of the seventeenth century,22 and later influenced (in turn) Joseph Story23
(in the United States), Albert Venn Dicey24 (in the United Kingdom), and
Joseph Henry Beale25 (in the United States), who would author the First
Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934) for the American Law Institute.
Beale’s first published work on private international law was in fact an
1896 book review of Dicey’s “A Digest of the Law of England with

20. See generally MILLS, supra note 2; Alex Mills, Normative Individualism and Jurisdiction in
Public and Private International Law: Toward a “Cosmopolitan Sovereignty”? (CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L
COMP. L. CONF., Working Paper May 1, 2012) [hereinafter Mills, Normative Individualism], available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2055295.
21. In Savigny’s words, “in cases of conflict of laws, the same legal relations (cases) have to
expect the same decision, whether the judgment be pronounced in this state or in that.” Savigny, supra
note 13, at 27.
22. Ulrich Huber, ‘De Conflictu Legum’ (1684) reprinted in Ernest G. Lorenzen, Huber’s de
Conflictu Legum 13 ILL. L. REV. 375, 401-18 (1919).
23. See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1834).
24. See generally ALBERT VENN DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE
TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1896) [hereinafter DICEY, DIGEST].
25. See generally JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) [hereinafter
BEALE, TREATISE (1935)].
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Reference to the Conflict of Laws,” published that same year.26 In that
review, Beale cited approvingly Dicey’s formulation of a private rights
based approach to the subject:
[T]he rules of so-called private international law are based on the
recognition of actually acquired rights, i.e. of rights which when
acquired could be really enforced by the sovereign of the State where
they have their origin.27

The foundations of this approach lay in the equality of sovereign states
and their exclusive sovereignty over territory, which were taken to imply
that acts within a territory “vested” rights in private parties, which ought
then to be recognized by foreign legal systems – necessitating rigid
territorial choice of law rules.28 This “ought,” however, was not a legal
imperative, as no sovereign could be commanded to do anything,29 and thus
the sense of obligation to recognize foreign rights arose, purely as part of
domestic law, from the need to do justice between the parties. From this
perspective, Dicey had earlier argued (with parts again cited approvingly
by Beale in his book review):
The application of foreign law is not a matter of caprice or option. It
does not arise from the desire of the sovereign of England, or of any
other sovereign, to show courtesy to other States. It flows from the
impossibility of otherwise determining whole classes of cases without

26. 10 HARV. L. REV. 168, 168 (1896) [hereinafter Beale, Book Review]. Dicey’s continuing
influence on Beale might also be attributed to the fact that Dicey was a visiting lecturer at Harvard
University Law School in 1898, where Beale was appointed a Professor in 1897 (after serving as an
Assistant Professor since 1892), although Beale had lectured on Conflict of Laws since the 1893-94
academic year. See Erwin N. Griswold, Mr. Beale and the Conflict of Laws 56 HARV. L. REV. 690, 69091 (1943). Beale’s first major work on conflict of laws was a multi-volume casebook (Selection of
Cases on the Conflict of Laws) completed in 1902. Id.
27. Albert Venn Dicey, Book Review, 1 L. Q. REV. 246, 248(1885) (reviewing FRANCIS T.
PIGGOTT, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM RELATING TO FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS AND PARTIES OUT OF THE JURISDICTION (2d ed. 1884)) [hereinafter Dicey, Book Review],
cited with approval in Beale, Book Review, supra note 26, at 168.
28. Thus, “a contract gives rise to legal obligations, because in the place where the act of contract
takes place a legal obligation is created by that act. When two men shake hands in Boston, the law of
England is incapable of attaching any legal consequence to their act. There is no law of England where
the act is done. The law of Massachusetts is there, ready, if it chooses, to give the act legal significance.
If it does not choose, the act is incapable of having a legal significance. No right, in other words, can
spring up on the soil of Massachusetts, unless it is created by the laws of Massachusetts.” Beale, Book
Review, supra note 26, at 170.
29. Thus, Dicey argued (following Austin) that “The principles of international law, properly so
called. . . are not in the proper sense of the term ‘laws’, for they are not commands proceeding from any
sovereign.” DICEY, DIGEST, supra note 24, at 14.
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gross inconvenience and injustice to litigants, whether natives or
foreigners. . . . [T]he courts, e.g. of England, never in strictness enforce
foreign law; when they are said to do so, they enforce not foreign laws,
but rights acquired under foreign laws.30

The one point of criticism which Beale made in his review of Dicey’s
book was to query whether Dicey had himself been consistent with this
underlying principle, in accepting a role for party autonomy in the law
applicable to contracts. In Beale’s view, this was contrary to the
sovereignty of states, as “parties cannot by their own will change the law of
the country in which they are”31 – an apparent conundrum which has
proved stubbornly elusive in private international law theory.32 Thus he
argued that a contract should exclusively be governed by the law of the
place of contracting, with only a secondary role, aiding in interpretation of
the contract, played by the law which the parties intended to govern their
relationship.33 This highlights that, although scholars like Beale and Dicey
characterized private international law as concerned with private rights,
they also derived the existence of those rights from a particular view of
state power – focusing on the exclusive territorial sovereignty of each state.
This, however, implied a major difference in the approach of these scholars
when compared to Savigny – for them, private international law was
strictly a matter of national law, and not a question of ordering derived
from the existence of an international community of states. These two
perspectives on private international law may, therefore, be fairly described
as competing “paradigms” – approaches or perspectives whose
incompatible foundational principles render them incommensurable.34 It is
for this reason that Savigny could simply dismiss vested rights as “a
complete circle; for we can only know what are vested rights, if we know
beforehand by what local law we are to decide as to their complete
acquisition”35 – but equally that such criticism would be entirely
unpersuasive to later figures such as Dicey and Beale. As Thomas Kuhn

30. Id. at 10.
31. Beale, Book Review, supra note 26, at 170.
32. See, e.g., Mills, Normative Individualism, supra note 20.
33. Such a distinction between the “governing law” and the “law regulating interpretation” is not
unknown to the modern common law – it is similar to the position which is still applied in relation to
the law governing a will. The system of law governing the material validity of a will is determined to be
the law of the place of domicile of the deceased at the time of death, but the interpretation of the will is
regulated by the law which has been chosen or was intended by the deceased. See Dellar v. Zivy, [2007]
EWHC (Ch.) 2266 [21]-[23] (Eng.).
34. See Kuhn, supra note 12, at 150; Michaels, supra note 2, at 1610.
35. Savigny, supra note 13, at102-03.
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described it in introducing the concept of paradigms to the philosophy of
science:
[T]he proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in
different worlds. . . .Practicing in different worlds, the two groups of
scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the
same direction. . . . That is why a law that cannot even be demonstrated
to one group of scientists may occasionally seem intuitively obvious to
another.36

II. THE U.S. CHOICE OF LAW REVOLUTION
In the early part of the twentieth century, Beale’s vested rights
approach dominated thinking about private international law in the United
States – perhaps at least in part because “When he started to teach, his was
apparently the only course on Conflict of Laws given in any law school in
the country”.37 His approach was understood to require rigid territorial
choice of law rules, developed as part of federal law (and under the
influence of the Full Faith and Credit38 and Due Process39 clauses of the
U.S. Constitution), as a necessary consequence of the need to protect
vested rights. In 1926, it was suggested that the “Supreme Court has quite
definitely committed itself to a program of making itself, to some extent, a
tribunal for bringing about uniformity in the field of conflicts,”40 on the
basis that “the full faith and credit clause . . . impose[s] on a state court the
duty, in framing its local rule, to follow the statute of another state where,
in the opinion of the Supreme Court, the demands of justice require that
such a course be adopted.”41
But as Beale’s work culminated in the First Restatement on Conflict
36. Kuhn, supra note 12, at 150.
37. Griswold, supra note 26, at 690.
38. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe
the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.”). Key
cases included Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912), New York Life Insurance Company v.
Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914), New York Life Insurance Company v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918),
Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925), and Bradford Electric Light Company v.
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
39. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). There are two components to ‘due
process’: Amendment V, “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law” (affecting federal authorities, ratified in 1791); and Amendment XIV, § 1, “nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” (affecting the
States, ratified in 1868).
40. E. Merrick Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of
Conflict of Laws, 39 HARV. L. REV. 533, 560 (1926).
41. Id. at 544.
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of Laws, published in 1934, it came under major challenge, principally as a
result of the rise of American legal realism.42 Broadly put, American legal
realism was a reaction against a mechanical and formalistic approach to
jurisprudence, under which the application of law was (or aspired to be) a
quasi-scientific rational process. Legal realists argued instead that the
application of law was inherently indeterminate and necessarily involved
policy choices, with legal rules serving as rationalizations rather than
justifications for those choices.43 Methodologically, these critics shared
with Dicey an emphasis on the study of law as an empirical phenomenon,
with rules derived from case law representing the real practice of judges –
that theory should, therefore, follow from practice, and not the other way
round. As Walter Wheeler Cook put it:
In the present discussion it is proposed, instead of following the a priori
method, to adopt the procedure which has proved so fruitful in other
fields of science, viz. to observe concrete phenomena first and to form
generalizations afterwards. We shall therefore undertake to formulate
general statements as to what the “law” of a given country “can” or
“cannot” do in the way of attaching legal consequences to situations and
transactions by observing what has actually been done. In making our
observations we shall, however, find it necessary to focus our attention
upon what courts have done, rather than upon the description they have
given of the reasons for their action. Whatever generalizations we reach
will therefore purport to be nothing more than an attempt to describe in
as simple a way as possible the concrete judicial phenomena observed,
and their “validity” will be measured by their effectiveness in
accomplishing that purpose.44

Taking this empirical methodology further, other legal realists argued
that there was, indeed, nothing more to law than such “concrete judicial

42. See generally, e.g., Bruce Wardhaugh, From Natural Law to Legal Realism: Legal
Philosophy, Legal Theory, and the Development of American Conflict of Laws since 1830, 41 ME. L.
REV. 307 (1989).
43. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465-66 (1897)
(“Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing
legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and
nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form.”); L.L. Fuller, American
Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 435 (1934) (“The traditional conception of legal method
imposes a . . . hypocrisy on the modern judge. Often his procedure is to decide the case first on the
basis of ‘non-technical’ considerations. Then armed . . . with . . . fictions, analogies, [and] ‘theories’, he
proceeds to wring from his code or other body of doctrine the legally acceptable basis for his
decision.”); see also infra note 54 and accompanying text.
44. Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J.
457, 460 (1924); see also Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33
YALE L. J. 736 (1924).
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phenomena observed.” In the famous words of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.,
“prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law”,45 and thus “a legal duty so called
is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or omits certain things he will
be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment of the court; and so of a
legal right.”46 Somewhat ironically, as a Justice of the Supreme Court
Holmes provided one of the most influential endorsements of the vested
rights approach in holding (in respect of a claim arising out of an accident
in Mexico, but sued on in Texas) that:
The theory of the foreign suit is that, although the act complained of was
subject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation,
an obligatio, which, like other obligations, follows the person, and may
be enforced wherever the person may be found. . . . But as the only
source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it follows that
that law determines not merely the existence of the obligation . . . but
equally determines its extent.47

As a legal theorist, however, Holmes’ realist skepticism helped sow
the seeds for the US choice of law revolution against this approach.
For private international law, and choice of law in particular,48 the
legal realist perspective gave rise to an entirely different critique of vested
rights than that offered by Savigny – an external view of the identity of
private international law, which initiated the U.S. choice of law
revolution’s paradigm shift. If rights are not recognized by courts, but
rather created by them through judicial acts, then the idea that choice of

45. Holmes, supra note 43, at 460-1.
46. Id. at 458.
47. Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (footnotes omitted).
Holmes remained committed to this position at least as late as 1924, where in a letter to the English
legal scholar Sir Frederick Pollock he reaffirmed the strictness of his adherence to the vested rights
approach, even suggesting that “Dicey went further than I should in emphasizing local policy”, adding
“We used to fight about it. I mean Dicey and I.” See HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS – THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES & SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932 (Peabody
Museum) (Harvard University Press, 1961), p.138 (letter dated 11 June 1924).
48. This section focuses on choice of law, as it is in this field that the major theoretical challenges
have arisen in respect of private international law in the United States. A comparable analysis of rules
on jurisdiction in the United States might also be attempted – noting, for instance, the abandonment of
traditional territorial jurisdictional rules in favor of more open-textured ‘fairness-based’ approaches,
such as California’s rule that “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not
inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States” (California Code of Civil
Procedure, s.410.10), which limits jurisdiction only according to Due Process minimum contacts
requirements. These requirements appear, however, to have been recently tightened in Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011).
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law involves the recognition of foreign vested rights is not circular but
rather a meaningless legal fiction. Under this approach, rights do not in fact
exist until the local court decides whether or not to “enforce” them – a
decision which is not determined by legal doctrine but by judicial policy
and preference. Cook illustrated this problem by considering complex
foreign cross-border torts, such as where the wrongful act, the direct injury,
and the ultimate loss were suffered in different places. Since (according to
his analysis) more than one state might rightfully claim to regulate the
consequences of the act, under which law should it be decided whether a
right has vested. “Obviously”, concluded Cook, “we can no longer turn the
crank of the logical machine and produce the answer ready-made, for no
single state has exclusive jurisdiction; there is no single foreign right to
recognize and enforce.”49 For Cook, this posed an unanswerable question
for the vested rights approach: “If [a court] nevertheless gives the plaintiffs
a judgment, can we accurately describe that action otherwise than by
saying that the right so enforced is a right created by the law of [the court]
and not a foreign-created right?”50 Under this perspective, the right
enforced is really local in its foundation (thus Cook is sometimes described
as having developed the ‘local law’ theory),51 and its enforcement cannot
be explained or justified by a theory of vested rights. On this basis, Cook
highlighted the inconsistency between Holmes’ theoretical work and his
Supreme Court judgment cited above, arguing that:
The decision thus appears not as an inevitable outcome from fixed
premises (that the forum is enforcing an obligatio created by foreign law,

49. Cook, supra note 43, at 468; see similarly Lorenzen, supra note 44. This analysis reflected
both a practical reality of asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction, as well as the increased legal acceptance
of extraterritorial jurisdiction as part of U.S. law (see id. at 482-85), as well as under both public and
private international law. See generally, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of
American Law: A Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 50 LAW &CONTEMP. PROBS. 11
(1987); Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public
and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280 (1982). In public international law, the general
permissibility of extraterritorial regulation was controversially endorsed by the Permanent Court of
International Justice in SS “Lotus” (France v. Turkey) (1927) PCIJ Ser A, No 10 , which held (at
pp.18-19) that international law is “Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States
may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property or
acts outside their territory”, but rather “leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which is
only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to
adopt the principles which it regards as best and most suitable.” Id. at 19; see also Mills, supra note 20.
50. Id. at 469.
51. The judgments of Justice Learned Hand were influential here. For example, in Guinness v.
Miller (1923), 291 F 769, he had held that “no court can enforce any law but that of its own sovereign,
and, when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, he can only invoke an
obligation recognized by that sovereign.” Id. at 770.
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and must inevitably take it or leave it, just as it is), but for what it is, and
for what Mr. Justice Holmes undoubtedly knew it was – a practical result
based upon the reasons of policy established in prior cases.52

The need for reliance on prior cases was an important aspect of
Cook’s approach – he was not arguing that all judging is indeterminate, but
accepting that a decision may be guided by similar precedents which
establish relevant policies. In cases where analogies might be drawn with
more than one precedent – where more than one “rule” might govern – the
choice between analogies or precedents would itself be a policy decision
for the judge. He argued that this phenomenon had arisen more often in
conflict of laws, because of the relative scarcity of precedents, suggesting
that:
[A] writer attempting to set forth the “American law” upon the conflict
of laws is necessarily compelled more often than in any other field to
choose between conflicting rules. In making a choice between such rules,
it is obvious that here as elsewhere the basis must be a pragmatic one of
the effect of a decision one way or the other in giving a practical working
rule.53

Although Cook set the stage for the realist revolution by focusing
attention on the policy analysis inherent in deciding choice of law cases,
other scholars such as David F. Cavers carried the analysis further, arguing
that a more fundamental indeterminacy in legal decision-making displaced
the supposed certainty provided by precedent. In part, this was reflective of
a broader and more general philosophical critique of linguistic
determinacy, and in part it was a critique focused on the particular
characteristics (or perceived characteristics) of choice of law rules – the
availability of a variety of flexible exceptions, including characterization,
public policy, renvoi, and the substance-procedure distinction. Cavers thus
argued that existing choice of law rules were fundamentally flawed because
they failed to provide an accurate predictive device for judicial behavior –
to put this another way, there was a disconnect between the theory and
practice of private international law. Instead of a deterministic rule-based
analysis, judges were in fact making policy decisions based to some extent
on precedent but also significantly on their own evaluation of competing
policy interests.54

52. Id. at 480.
53. Id. at 488.
54. See generally, e.g., David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARV. L.
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Dual and opposing – almost contradictory – criticisms were therefore
raised. On the one hand, the rigid rules favored by the vested rights
approach often led to inappropriate results because the rules were
insufficiently attentive to policy considerations, and (since vested rights
viewed choice of law through the lens of state power) took insufficient
account of the expectations of private parties – as noted above, there was
for instance no room for party autonomy in Beale’s First Restatement,
despite practice and precedent to the contrary. On the other hand, such rigid
rules were often evaded through escape devices, which enabled judges to
circumvent the ‘undesirable’ consequences of their application. To adopt
the words of one prominent scholar, Brainerd Currie:
A sensitive and ingenious court can detect an absurd result and avoid it; I
am inclined to think that this has been done more often than not and that
therein lies a major reason why the system has managed to survive. At
the same time, we constantly run the risk that the court may lack
sensitivity and ingenuity; we are handicapped in even presenting the
issue in its true light; and instances of mechanical application of the rules
to produce indefensible results are by no means rare. Whichever of these
phenomena is the more common, it is a poor defense of the system to say
that the unacceptable results that it will inevitably produce can be
averted by disingenuousness if the courts are sufficiently alert.55

For such critics, then, the only choice of law rule which would
adequately describe and predict (and liberate) judicial decision making
would be an open-textured rule which expressly invited judges to carry out
an analysis of competing policy interests56 – in full awareness and
cognizance of the content of potentially applicable substantive laws (a
consideration strikingly absent in the traditional approaches examined
above, under which conflict of laws rules are blind to the content of the
potentially applicable laws).57 This required a reorientation of private
international law, away from the traditional objective of “conflicts” justice,

REV. 173 (1933); see DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965).
55. See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 181 (1963).
56. This approach was at least partially inspired by the Supreme Court decision in Alaska Packers
Ass’n v. Industrial Accidents Commission of California, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), in which the Court had
held that choice of law disputes should be resolved “not by giving automatic effect to the Full Faith and
Credit clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its own statutes to those of the other,
but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision
according to their weight.” Id. at 547. This “interest-balancing” approach to the Due Process clause was
subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Allstate Insurance v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302
(1981).
57. See, e.g., Cavers, supra note 54, at 180ff.
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toward the same values of “material” or “substantive” justice which
motivate private law.58
There are of course a wide and diverse range of different approaches
and techniques which were introduced as part of the U.S. conflict of laws
revolution – perhaps as many techniques as scholars, if not more. Not all of
these invite the courts to evaluate the potential substantive outcomes of a
choice of potentially applicable laws themselves. We might again highlight,
for instance, the work of Currie, who argued that an analysis of government
interests would frequently reveal a “false conflict,” under which only one
state was genuinely interesting in regulating the disputed relationship.
Where a true conflict did exist, he argued that the forum ought to resolve it
in favor of its own law – a consequence which flowed from the fact that the
court would be evaluating domestic against foreign policies, and was in no
position to decide that the foreign policy was superior to that of their own
legislature.59
It is characteristic of Currie’s approach that the analysis of the
“interests” of each state should be conducted at least principally through
interpretation of the potentially applicable statutes. It thus involves the
determination of whether a state has subjectively asserted an interest, rather
than an objective determination of which state has the ‘greater’ or ‘more
genuine’ interest.60 It should be noted that at times Currie did stretch the
boundaries of interpretation toward more objective considerations,
suggesting for example that it might involve asking “whether the relation of
the forum to the case is such as to provide a legitimate basis for the
assertion of an interest in the application of that policy”61 (although he did
not develop in depth criteria for determining this question of legitimacy62).
Nevertheless, his method in general attempts to detect a literal ‘conflict of
laws’, rather than resolve a potential conflict of regulatory authority. Under
this approach, an assertion of regulatory authority – local or foreign – can
never be invalid, although foreign assertions may be trumped by an

58. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE (1993); Symeon
C. Symeonides, Material Justice and Conflicts Justice in Choice of Law, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
OF LAWS FOR THE THIRD MILLENIUM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER (Borchers &
Zekoll eds., 2001),
59. Currie, supra note 55, at 181, arguing that “assessment of the respective values of the
competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine which is to prevail, is a
political function of a very high order. This is a function that should not be committed to courts in a
democracy.”
60. See Mills, supra note 2, at 259ff.
61. See Currie (1963), supra note 55, at 183 (emphasis added).
62. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of Interest Analysis, 32 AM J. COMP. L.
1, 9 (1984).

MILLS MACRO FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

460

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

12/5/2013 1:20 PM

[Vol 23:445

overlapping claim by the forum state.
The choice of law revolution in the United States was further
facilitated by the decision of the Supreme Court to back down from its
previous program of establishing federal choice of law rules.63 In Klaxon v
Stentor Electric (1941), the Court determined instead that federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction are obliged to apply the choice of law rules
of the states within which they are sitting – effectively, that choice of law
rules fell within state and not federal regulatory authority.64 Although
subsequently the Court has continued to recognize some constitutional
limits on state choice of law rules, requiring ‘significant contacts’ to justify
the application of a state’s own law,65 the effect of this decision was to shift
almost entirely the choice of law debate from the federal level to the
diverse states. This opened US choice of law to the process of legal
experimentation which has characterized it since. At the same time,
however, it largely undermined the collective goals which had been an
inherent part of the perspective which had previously been adopted on
choice of law. Left to each state, it was impossible for choice of law rules
to aspire to the universalism of Savigny’s objective system of allocation of
private law regulatory authority. This in turn transferred attention to the
content of choice of law rules, now viewed as policy decisions for each
individual state. The focus of analysis thus shifted from issues of ordering
or conflict avoidance to questions of justice, fairness, or appropriateness for
the resolution of the particular conflict at hand. This in turn reinforced the
work of theorists who had argued that choice of law rules should be opentextured and allow judges to evaluate competing interests, particularly
legislative objectives, in determining the governing law.
While a Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws was produced in
1969, it has been criticized for incoherently combining a variety of
theoretical approaches rather than bringing clarity. In reference to a claim
in contract, for example, under the Second Restatement the courts should
follow an express or implied choice of law by the parties,66 unless there is
no substantial relationship with the parties or the dispute and there is no
other reasonable basis for the choice, and subject to the rule that the parties
cannot contract contrary to a “fundamental policy of a State which has a
materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination of the
63. See Alex Mills, Federalism in the European Union and the United States: Subsidiarity,
Private Law and the Conflict of Laws, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 369, 408-21 (2010).
64. 313 U.S. 487, 494-98 (1941).
65. See, e.g., Allstate Insurance v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Philips Petroleum Company v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Sun Oil Company v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
66. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1969).
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particular issue.”67 If no choice of law is made by the parties, flexible
choice of law rules apply, for example, selecting the law of the State with
the “most significant relationship” to the contract.68 The Second
Restatement lists a series of relevant principles to be considered in
determining which State has the most significant relationship, which
include “the needs of the interstate and international systems,” “the relevant
policies of the forum,” “the relevant policies of other interested states,”
“the protection of justified expectations,” and “certainty, predictability and
uniformity of results.”69 Additional “contacts” are specified for particular
subject areas, such as, in the case of contracts, the “place of contracting”,
“place of performance”, and location of the parties.70 Given this diversity
of considerations, there seems little cause for confidence that the Second
Restatement is (or aspires to be) a useful tool to predict the outcome of
individual cases, or that it strongly advances consistent decision making in
choice of law problems. In effect, if not in intention, the variety of
theoretical positions seemingly combined in the Second Restatement has
had the effect of expanding the degree of judicial discretion in choice of
law problems, consistent with the aspirations (if not the methodologies) of
most U.S. choice of law revolutionaries.
III. THE EU PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVOLUTION
Prior to the emergence of unified European rules, private international
law had become a matter of fairly diverse national regulation in the various
European states – the product of increased dissonance in the debate about
which connecting factors should be relied upon to “localize” a legal
relationship.71 Savigny’s vision of a uniform system of private international
law was thus largely sidelined by the reality of disparate national traditions
– only partially countered by the harmonizing influence of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law, an institutional embodiment and
direct inheritor of the internationalist tradition in private international law.72
In the diverse European legal systems, private international law – while
retaining a sense of its traditional internationalist aspirations – was
increasingly adapted to serve domestic policies, partly influenced by U.S.

67. Id. at § 187(2)(b).
68. Id. at § 188.
69. Id. at § 6.
70. Id. at § 188(2).
71. See supra Part I.A.
72. See, e.g., Geert De Baere & Alex Mills, T.M.C. Asser and Public and Private International
Law: The Life and Legacy of “a Practical Legal Statesman,” NETH. YEARBOOK INT’L L., Dec. 2011, at
3, 28.
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theoretical developments, but less so by US techniques.73
Under the common law, the theoretical baggage of Dicey’s vested
rights theory had been largely cast off, in favor of a pragmatism which
involved loosening rather than entirely abandoning old choice of law
techniques, but which placed greater emphasis on finding the most
appropriate solution for each individual case.74 Private international law
was thus, in the common law tradition, considered to be focused on
achieving justice and fairness in individual cases, although with little
analysis of what these criteria might mean when more than one legal order
is potentially applicable, and while remaining blind to the substance of the
possible governing laws.75
Within the European Union, the conception and function of private
international law has, however, been transformed over recent years.76
Instead of being viewed as national law, serving national policy interests,
private international law has developed a new identity as part of the process
of defining the European legal order and facilitating the efficient
functioning of the internal market. In 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam gave
the institutions of the European Union a new competence in the field of
private international law.77 As amended and renumbered by the Lisbon
Treaty (2009), Article 81(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (previously the Treaty on the European Community) now
provides (in part) that:
the European Parliament and the Council . . . shall adopt measures,

73. See, e.g., Michaels, The New European Choice of Law Revolution, supra note 2, at 1616.
74. JAMES FAWCETT & JANEEN M. CARRUTHERS, CHESHIRE, NORTH AND FAWCETT: PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (14th ed. 2008) (“There is no sacred principle that pervades all decisions, but
when the circumstances indicate that the internal law of a foreign country will provide a solution more
just, more convenient and more in accord with the expectations of the parties than the internal law of
England, the English judge does not hesitate to give effect to the foreign rules. What particular foreign
law shall be chosen depends on different considerations in each legal category. Neither justice nor
convenience is promoted by rigid adherence to any one principle. . . . Private international law is no
more an exact science than is any other part of the law of England; it is not scientifically founded on the
reasoning of jurists, but it is beaten out on the anvil of experience.”).
75. See e.g., MILLS, supra note 2, at 3.
76. See Mills, Federalism in the European Union and the United States, supra note 63, at 399400.
77. See generally Andrew Dickinson, European Private International Law: Embracing New
Horizons or Mourning the Past?, 1 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 197 (2005); Katharina Boele-Woelki & Ronald
H. van Ooik, The Communitarization of Private International Law, 4 YEARBOOK OF PRIVATE INT’L
LAW 1 (2002); Oliver Remien, European Private International Law, the European Community and its
Emerging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 53, 60 (2001); Jurgen
Basedow, The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws under the Treaty of Amsterdam, 37 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 687 (2000).
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particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal
market, aimed at ensuring:
(a) the mutual recognition and enforcement between Member States of
judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases; [and]
....
(c) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States
concerning conflict of laws and of jurisdiction78

This enhanced regulatory capability has received expression in an
active legislative program which sees private international law developing
an increasingly prominent role in the European legal system.79 The
Brussels I Regulation (2001)80 has been followed by the Brussels II
Regulation (2003),81 Rome I Regulation (2008),82 and Rome II Regulation
(2007).83 A new Rome III Regulation has recently been adopted and come
into effect from June 2012 in certain Member States (under enhanced
cooperation rules),84 dealing with choice of law in divorce and legal
separation. A proposal for a Regulation on succession and wills85 was
presented in 2009, and two further proposals for Regulations on
matrimonial property86 and the property consequences of registered
partnerships87 were presented in March 2011.

78. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 81(2) Mar.
30, 2010, 2010 OJ (C 83) 47.
79. See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Crawford & Janeen M. Carruthers, Conflict of Loyalties in the Conflict
of Laws: The Cause, The Means and the Cost of Harmonisation, JURID. REV. 251 (2005); Boele-Woelki
& van Ooik, supra note 78; Peter North, Private International Law: Change or Decay?, 50 INT’L
COMP. L.Q. 477 (2001).
80. See supra note 9.
81. Council Regulation 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental
responsibility (EC), repealing Regulation 1347/2000, EU OJ L 338, 23 December 2003 (EC).
82. See supra note 11.
83. Regulation 864/2007, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the
Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199).
84. Council Regulation 1259/2010, Implementing Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of the Law
Applicable to Divorce and Legal Separation (Rome III), 2010 O.J. (L 343) 10, 16.
85. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions and Authentic Instruments in
Matters of Succession and the Creation of a European Certificate of Succession, COM (2009) 154 final
(Oct. 14, 2009).
86. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions in Matters of Matrimonial Property Regimes, COM (2011)
126 final (Mar. 16, 2011).
87. Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions Regarding the Property Consequences of Registered
Partnerships, COM (2011) 127 final (Mar. 16, 2011).
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The significance of this European regulation is that it has effected a
transformation not only in the source of rules of private international law –
from national law to European law – but a transformation in their character
and function. Within the European Union, private international law rules
are viewed as serving a systemic or public ordering function, allocating
regulatory authority between Member States in the service of “the proper
functioning of the internal market”. The transformation of private
international law – the ‘paradigm shift’ – has thus come once again in
response to an external critique of the subject. Private international law was
examined from the point of view of the needs of the European internal
market, and found wanting. The diversity of private international law rules
was found to be an obstacle to the efficient functioning of the market, and
national rules (and the national policies they inherently reflected) were cast
aside. This was, therefore, not a theoretical revolution from the inside, led
by private international lawyers, but a practical revolution led by European
actors focused on economic considerations – with the theory coming
largely ex post facto in an effort to understand the transformations which
are occurring or have already occurred.
To some extent, the EU revolution may be considered a rediscovery of
the original function of rules of private international law, albeit newly
adapted to the service of particular regulatory objectives – the EU
revolution has (re)conceived of private international law rules as concerned
with the appropriate allocation of regulatory authority, distantly echoing
Savigny. Although these ideas have been transplanted to a federal context,
they have nevertheless provided an important renewal of private
international law’s traditional public dimension, and given the subject fresh
prominence and academic interest in the European Union. This is perhaps
particularly notable with respect to the revival in significance and stature of
the traditional objective of avoiding conflicts between legal orders. Strict
rules of lis pendens and judgment recognition in the Brussels I Regulation
strive to achieve this by reducing instances of overlapping jurisdiction
between Member States, based on the argument that “In the interests of the
harmonious administration of justice it is necessary to minimize the
possibility of concurrent proceedings and to ensure that irreconcilable
judgments will not be given in two Member States.”88 The harmonisation
of choice of law similarly aims to ensure decisional consistency, based on
the argument that “The proper functioning of the internal market creates a
need, in order to improve the predictability of the outcome of litigation,
certainty as to the law applicable and the free movement of judgments, for

88. Brussels I Regulation (2001), supra note 9, Recital 15.
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the conflict-of-law rules in the Member States to designate the same
national law irrespective of the country of the court in which an action is
brought.”89 These traditional objectives of private international law are,
however, reconceived as means to a ‘greater’ end – the principal objective
of improving the efficient functioning of the European internal market.
IV. LEARNING FROM THE U.S. AND EU EXPERIENCES
The analysis above has highlighted four strikingly different models of
private international law, and four different ways of thinking about its
function and purpose. First, the idea of private international law as
concerned with the international allocation of state power (which we might
associate with Savigny). Second, the idea of private international law as
concerned with the national recognition of private rights (which we might
associate with Dicey and Beale). Third, the idea of private international law
as a question of identifying and pursuing state policy interests (which we
might associate with the US choice of law revolution). And fourth, the idea
of private international law as aiming to increase the efficiency of the
functioning of the European internal market (which we might associate
with the EU private international law revolution).
The following are some critical reflections on what we might learn
from the experiences of the U.S. and EU revolutions in private international
law. The final section then offers some concluding thoughts as to how
private international law might be conceived or reconceived in light of the
analysis in this article.
A. The U.S. experience
It is easy to see why U.S. scholars reacted against the artificial
formalism of the vested rights approach. Savigny’s criticism of the
approach – that it is circular, because it is private international law rules
which determine when rights arise – has a great deal of bite, at least once
ideas of ‘natural rights’ are dismissed.90 The strict territorialism which
underpinned Huber’s commitment to vested rights was also increasingly
untenable by the early nineteenth century, when it was already clear that
states were asserting regulatory authority extraterritorially in a range of
circumstances.91 Since private international law rules were not serving their
purported function of mechanically recognizing private rights, but were

89. Rome I Regulation (2008), supra note 11, Recital 6; and (identically) Rome II Regulation
(2007), supra note 83, Recital 21.
90. See, e.g., Mills (2009), supra note 2, at 57-58.
91. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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rather determining when such rights should be said to have arisen, judges
were in reality navigating blindly with no policy direction from the
theoretical fictions which purported to guide them.92 US revolutionary
scholars sought to uncover the ‘real’ policies and decisions operating
behind or through private international law rules, and argued that the rules
ought to openly reflect those practices.93 The U.S. revolution was of critical
importance in drawing attention to the fact that private international law
rules are not mechanical or neutral, but themselves engage with a variety of
policy considerations. Private international law would be – and indeed was
– much poorer without these insights.
It is less certain whether the variety of approaches introduced by US
private international law scholars have represented clear progress in filling
this policy void – the limited international influence of the US revolution
might suggest otherwise. A range of difficulties might be tentatively
highlighted.94 There seems to be a tendency in much US scholarship to
subsume private international law questions within other considerations.
There is indeed something perhaps inevitably destructive in the idea,
central to the legal realist critique, that private international law theory
should follow private international law practice (and not the other way
round),95 as this leaves practice to be shaped by externally defined
considerations. It is difficult to avoid the impression that at least some
choice of law scholarship has theorized itself into the margins, achieving
only a form of self-obsolescence. Perhaps this is indeed reflected in the (at
least perceived) decline of private international law as an object of
academic study in the United States, flying otherwise paradoxically in the
face of its ever-increasing practical importance.
Some strains of government interest analysis, for instance, require the
court to do nothing more than interpret potentially applicable state statutes,
and in case more than one purports to govern the dispute or relationship,
apply the law of the forum.96 From this perspective, however, choice of law
almost seems to disappear as an independent process or consideration,
supposedly swallowed by statutory interpretation and by subservience to
legislative policies. But such an approach may itself be highly artificial and
unpredictable as legislators are seldom cognizant, let alone expressly clear,
as to whether the rules they are adopting will apply to international cases

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Wardhaugh, supra note 43 and accompanying text.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Juenger (1984), supra note 62.
See supra note 43 .
See supra note 58.
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(or as to what exact policies they are trying to advance).97 In addition, there
are difficulties in adapting this approach to cases governed by the common
law, in which there is no legislative intention to divine. This approach may
also be highly unsatisfactory, as it reduces choice of law to mere assertions
of interest – in the absence of any underlying criteria for when an assertion
of interest is ‘legitimate’, which begs a raft of questions. The focus on
asserted interests also implicitly discards the important possibility that
other states may have an interest in or policy in favor of non-regulation. It
may further over-emphasize the role of private international law in the
resolution of particular disputes, and under-emphasize the role private
international law plays in guiding the behavior of international actors,
many of whom might favor certainty of any kind over open-textured rules
which seek to advance indeterminate state policy interests. Indeed, it is
difficult to see what role it leaves for the expectations and agreements of
private parties. In addition, it may further ignore or underplay interests
which states may have beyond their legislative assertions, such as interests
in harmonious co-existence with other states, in the avoidance of
duplicative or inefficient litigation98, or in the forms of international
cooperation which take place through the Hague Conference on Private
International Law in response to concrete practical problems, such as crossborder adoption99 or child abduction.100
Finally, the favoring of the law of the forum either expressly or
implicitly adopted in many such approaches seems to make choice of law a
secondary consideration to jurisdiction – under this approach it may be
jurisdictional rules which effectively determine the applicable law. But this
again neglects the particular policy considerations at stake in choice of law
rules in favor of the different considerations at play in determining

97. See generally Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 392 (1980). It should also be pointed out that where questions do clearly arise concerning the
intended scope of potentially applicable statutes, traditional choice of law methodology does not
preclude that determination through statutory interpretation as a second stage of the choice of law
process – once the governing legal order has been determined, a further inquiry may indeed be required
into which specific laws of that order apply. This does not, however, render the first stage (the
determination of the applicable legal order through choice of law rules) redundant, except to the extent
that it is overridden through ‘mandatory’ rules. See generally Trevor C. Hartley, Mandatory Rules in
International Contracts: The Common Law Approach, in 266 RECUEIL DES COURS 337 (1997). 337.
98. See, e.g., Alfred Hill, Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor
Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463 (1960).
99. See generally, Intercountry Adoption Section of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=45 (last visited Apr. 5,
2013).
100. See generally Child Abduction Section of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=21 (last visited Apr. 5, 2013).
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jurisdiction – which may be based, for example, on general contacts
between the defendant and the forum rather than any connection between
the subject matter of the dispute and the forum.101
In short, such approaches – under which private international law is
seen to serve other domestic policies – seem inevitably to neglect the
specific issues raised by cross-border private disputes and the insights
which private international law and particularly choice of law might have
to offer. In this view of private international law, there is little room left for
considerations of the appropriate allocation of state power, or the avoidance
of conflicting regulation. The experience of the Second Restatement of
Conflict of Laws has given rise to other, similar concerns. It has been
argued that by “[t]rying to be all things to all people, it produced mush”.102
More particularly, the Second Restatement approach is open to the
criticism that by including too many ‘choice-influencing considerations’103
and being too open-textured, it effectively defers any decisions to
individual judges in individual cases, leaving little room for the
development of broad and coherent policies. By individualizing choice of
law decisions under rules which do little to constrain discretionary
decision-making, such an approach once again seems to deny private
international law its own policy impact – in being open to everything, it
strives for nothing.
B. The EU experience
It is, once again, not difficult to understand the perspective of the
instigators of European private international law reforms. Viewed from the
point of view of the interests of the internal market, the range of
inconsistent private international law regulations which were present in the
various Member States prior to European reforms clearly appears as an
obstacle or obstruction to the smooth functioning of the market. European
harmonization of private international law is an obvious response to this
problem, at least in the absence of the more legally and politically
challenging and contentious project of the harmonization of European
private law.104 While such harmonization projects always present
difficulties in terms of the potential for inconsistent national interpretations
of the rules, the European Court of Justice has gradually been, and will
101. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011).
102. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 253 (1992).
103. See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV.
267 (1966).
104. See, e.g., Mills, supra note 63.

MILLS MACRO FINAL(DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

THE IDENTITIES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

12/5/2013 1:20 PM

469

continue to be, able to offer definitive guidance on disputed provisions. As
further practical harmonization is achieved, private international law in the
European Union is moving ever closer to at least some of the traditional
aspirations associated in this article with Savigny. Rules of private
international law will increasingly effect an ordering of private law
regulatory authority between the various Member States, aiming to
minimize the potential for jurisdictional conflicts by ensuring that only one
Member State takes jurisdiction over a dispute (through harmonized rules
on jurisdiction and lis pendens), that wherever a dispute is litigated the
same law will be applied (through harmonized choice of law rules), and
that the resolution of a dispute in one Member State will almost always
preclude the re-litigation of that dispute in another Member State (through
rules on the recognition and enforcement of judgments).
There are, however, a number of problems which have arisen in
practice with the development of European private international law
regulation. One is a consequence of the fact that this regulation is focused
on achieving federal rather than international objectives. The Brussels I
Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments105 has faced particular difficulties concerning its scope of
application. The terms of the Regulation determine its applicability
principally on the basis of the domicile of the defendant in any civil or
commercial litigation – potentially encompassing claims against EU
domiciled defendants which are otherwise entirely unconnected with the
internal market. However, the rules of the Regulation are drafted only with
internal market problems in mind – giving no consideration, for example,
to the effect of jurisdiction agreements in favor of non-Member States,
subject matter connections with non-Member States, or prior proceedings
in non-Member States.106 The practical impact of this limitation is that the
allocation of regulatory competence to Member States may not sufficiently
take into consideration the connections between a dispute and non-Member
States. The Regulation may thus end up allocating regulatory authority
inappropriately, and actually facilitate more conflicts between Member
State and non-Member State legal orders. The general problem with the
Brussels I Regulation is a failure for its rules to match up to its scope (both
as interpreted by the European Court of Justice) – its scope encompasses a
variety of non-internal market questions, but its rules are motivated only by
105. Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, O.J. (L 12).
106. This well-known problem is highlighted by the ECJ decision in Owusu v. Jackson [2005] ILPr
25, [2005] ECR I-553; see, e.g., Richard Fentiman, Choice of Law in Europe: Uniformity and
Integration, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2021, 2041 (2008).
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internal market considerations, with limited recognition of their
‘externalities’.
Further related problems also arise from the influence of the internal
market on the design of European rules of private international law. One
impact is that European rules have tended to be more rigid, aimed at
achieving certainty and predictability for market participants, rather than
necessarily at achieving appropriate outcomes.107 From a common law
perspective, having moved away from the rigid rules previously adopted
under the motivation of Dicey’s vested rights approach, this change has
appeared regressive.108 In some cases, the selection of rule has also itself
been problematic. In the Rome Convention and now Rome I Regulation,
for instance, the law applicable to a contract in the absence of party choice
is (rebuttably) presumed to be the law of the location (variously defined) of
the characteristic performer of the contract.109 In many cases it is difficult
to see much sense behind this choice – why one party’s home law ought to
govern a relationship which is centered elsewhere, around the place of
performance of the contract. This is a concern which has arguably led
English courts (historically more used to applying territorial choice of law
rules, including under the influence of vested rights, which also led to a
territorial influence in applying the later “proper law of the contract”
approach110) to a greater willingness to overcome the presumption
compared with the courts of other Member States.111 The presumption has
the benefit of at least appearing more certain and predictable, particularly
where contractual performance crosses borders, but this ‘internal market’
objective is not a value traditionally protected in private international law
rules which have historically been more focused on ensuring the
appropriate allocation of regulatory authority.
Similarly, in the context of jurisdiction the Brussels I Regulation has
been interpreted to mean that considerations of lis pendens – motivated by

107. This is of course a question of balancing rather than absolutes – for example, Recital 16 to the
Rome I Regulation, supra note 11, provides that “[t]o contribute to the general objective of this
Regulation, legal certainty in the European judicial area, the conflict-of law rules should be highly
foreseeable,” but immediately acknowledges that “[t]he courts should, however, retain a degree of
discretion to determine the law that is most closely connected to the situation.”
108. See, e.g., Fentiman, supra note 106.
109. Rome I Regulation, supra note 11, Article 4(1) and 4(2), in conjunction with Article 19.
110. See Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v. Kuwait Insurance Co [1984] A.C. 50 (H.L.), 62 (stressing
the general importance of the ‘lex loci solutionis’ (law of the place of performance) in identifying the
system of law governing a contract, although noting that the importance of this factor “varies with the
nature of the contract”); see also, Coupland v. Arabian Gulf Oil Co [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1136, 1150.
111. See, e.g., Jonathan Hill, Choice of Law in Contract under the Rome Convention: The
Approach of the UK Courts, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 325 (2004).
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avoiding potentially conflicting parallel proceedings in different Member
States – outweigh the need to give practical effect to jurisdiction112 or
arbitration113 agreements. Thus, a court of an EU Member State second
seized of a dispute, even if it believes there is an exclusive jurisdiction
agreement in its favor, is obliged to stay its proceedings in favor of the
Member State court first seized, clearing the way for ‘strategic’ (even bad
faith) litigation tactics – the infamous “Italian torpedo.”114
It is true that these problems are being (partially) addressed under
recently agreed reforms.115 They nevertheless highlight a problematic
prioritization of the avoidance of possible conflicts of laws – a ‘secondary’
objective of traditional private international law – over its ‘primary’
objective of appropriately allocating regulatory authority between states.
The lack of concern over appropriateness is almost reminiscent of Currie’s
(seemingly half-joking) suggestion that, since “[a]ll that is required . . . is a
way of determining, simply and certainly, what law will be applied, so that
transactions can be planned and litigation undertaken with some confidence
as to the outcome – and, in addition, assurance that the decision will not
vary according to the forum . . . a nearly ideal choice-of-law rule . . . would
be that the governing law shall be that of the State first in alphabetical
order.”116 In the unlikely event a common language could be agreed upon,
such a rule would no doubt achieve a level of certainty and predictability in
choice of law between EU Member States, but at the cost of a principled or
appropriate allocation of regulatory authority.
In summary, the various criticisms leveled at European regulation of
private international law tend to circle around the idea that it has favored
certainty and predictability over appropriateness – both in terms of
applying relatively rigid rules which preclude fact-sensitive decisions, and
in terms of the questionable appropriateness of some of the rules chosen. In
general, it seems that at least to some extent a traditional policy objective
of private international law – the appropriate allocation or division of
regulatory authority – has been partially sidelined by other policy
objectives, in particular the efficiency of the internal market. This is, of

112. Gasser v. MISAT, [2003] E.C.R. I-14693.
113. Allianz SpA v. West Tankers, [2009] E.C.R. I-663.
114. Mario Franzosi, Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo, 7 EUR. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 382 (1997); see also, Trevor C. Hartley, The European Union and the Systematic Dismantling of
the Common Law of Conflict of Laws, 54 INT’L & COMP. L.Q 813, 815 (2005).
115. See Council Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (recast), O.J. (L 351).
116. Brainerd Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. CHI.
L. REV. 258, 279 (1961).
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course, a question of degree – EU private international law has not adopted
arbitrary choice of law rules, and in some cases specialized choice of law
rules have been designed with other regulatory goals in mind,117
particularly when it comes to the protection of weaker parties, like
consumers118 and employees,119 and the protection of the environment.120
But in general the critics of EU private international law rules have
highlighted what is perceived as an excessive focus on the interests of the
internal market over other policy objectives which ought to be taken into
consideration, including the traditional interests of private international law
in regulating the allocation of competence between states, not limited to
EU Member States.
V. SO WHAT IS (OR SHOULD BE) THE IDENTITY OF PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
It should be apparent from the analysis in this article that there is a
considerable range of different ideas of what private international law “is”
in the sense of how we should understand its purpose and function. Under
different theoretical and practical perspectives, private international law has
been considered as international or at least natural law, federal law,
regional law, or local law. It has been considered as serving the public
functions of ordering authority between states or pursuing state-defined
legislative policy interests, or as serving the private functions of giving
effect to party expectations or protecting private rights acquired under
foreign law. Clearly more than one answer might be given to the question
of private international law’s “true” character. Private international law is,
to some extent, what we choose it to be, and this choice reflects (or ought
to reflect) the values we have which we think it might serve to promote.
For this author at least, one such fundamental value is what I have referred
to elsewhere as “justice pluralism”121 – the acceptance that the questions of
private law do not have a single ‘correct’ answer, that different societies are
capable of making (and entitled to make) different decisions about such
questions, and that in a world of coexisting states those differentiated
determinations of the just outcome of a dispute ought to be given at least a
degree of accommodation. This value is by no means the only value which
might underpin a theory of private international law, and it is of course not
117. See, e.g., Ulla Liukkunen, Managing Legal Diversity in the EU: The Case of Subject-Specific
Conflicts Rules, 20 Eur. Rev. Priv. Law 1045 (2012).
118. Rome I Regulation , supra note 11, at Article 6.
119. Rome I Regulation, supra note 11, at Article 8.
120. Rome II Regulation, supra note 83, at Article 7.
121. See Mills, supra note 2, at Chapter 1.
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enough on its own (it does not tell us how or when that accommodation
should be provided – itself at least partly a question of “justice” in the
distribution of regulatory power),122 but a choice of this or some other value
frames our perspective on private international law in foundational ways.
Advocating for a particular ‘identity’ for private international law may
therefore ultimately best be characterized less as a contest of legal
arguments or traditions, and more as a choice between competing values.
Perhaps the ostensible stagnation in private international law theory may at
least be partially attributed to the philosophical depth of the problems it
invites us to confront.
At the same time, however, in the face of seemingly ever-increasing
globalization, the practical significance of private international law has
never been greater. Perhaps, then, there is some cause for hope that the
subject might receive renewed attention,123 and that through this the
traditional values of private international law, seemingly neglected in both
the United States and European Union, might be given renewed
consideration. This is not to advocate a luddite response to the machinery
of modern techniques. Indeed, it may be observed that each approach to
private international law analyzed in this article seems to have something to
offer in developing a full understanding of private international law’s
actual and potential identity, in both positive and negative terms. We might
admire Savigny’s idealistic internationalism and value his analysis of the
traditional policy objectives of private international law in allocating
regulatory authority and avoiding conflicting regulation – but his
dependence on natural law foundations which obscure the policy decisions
and practical difficulties inherent in the design and negotiation of particular
private international law rules seems anachronistic. From Dicey, we might
recognize the necessity of an attentiveness to private party interests – but it
is difficult to see much in favor of his circular dependence on an equally
outmoded theory of vested rights. Looking at the U.S. choice of law
revolution, we might learn from the greater focus placed on the policy
choices inherent in private international law – but be wary of the
overshadowing of private international law’s own traditional policy goals
and interests, including the neglect of its systemic objectives. And finally,

122. Id. at 23, 303.
123. Although as a note of pessimism, each era of private international law seems to characterize
itself as a period of unprecedented globalization under which the subject demands urgent attention –
Joseph Story, for instance, noted in the Preface to his 1834 Commentary on the Conflict of Laws that
“[t]he subject is one of great importance and interest; and from the increasing intercourse between
foreign States, as well as between the different States of the American Union, it is daily brought home
more and more to the ordinary business and pursuits of human life.”
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from the EU revolution in private international law, we might welcome the
revival of the traditional public systemic perspective on private
international law – but be less enthusiastic about the narrow and at times
formalist conception of private international law’s function and effect
which is the product of the centrality of the internal market in the
development of EU private international law.
So where might this all leave us? I would argue that the identity,
special significance and potential ‘unique selling point’ of private
international law can best be understood through a public perspective –
something which the U.S. and EU revolutions have in common – but one
which should not neglect (or construe narrowly) its policy dimensions or
real world effects. This does not mean a nostalgic return to the abstract
idealist traditions of Savigny’s private international law – but it does mean
not losing sight of the values and objectives which private international law
has traditionally sought to promote. Recognizing this identity of private
international law means seeing it as a form of “secondary law” (in H.L.A.
Hart’s sense)124 which serves the international, federal or regional function
of ordering the distribution of regulatory authority between legal orders,
accepting and reinforcing their pluralism. The interaction between these
different levels of governance in private international law may itself give
rise to complications, which have been insufficiently appreciated in the
development of at least EU rules, but this does not render them
incommensurable.125 At each level, by imposing ‘architectural’ order on the
allocation of regulatory authority between systems, private international
law acts ‘publicly’ (although largely without a public institutional
hierarchy126) to coordinate and preserve the diversity of those legal orders.
In so doing, it serves its own traditional policy purposes (regrettably
marginalized in different ways under both US and EU developments), as
well as potentially interacting in various ways with the substantive policy
purposes underlying different private law legal orders, by prioritizing
certain parties or interests.
Private international law is thus not only important for what it does,
but for how it does it: the way in which, for instance, it defines the contours
of potentially applicable legal systems, and balances the interests of
claimants against those of defendants, at the same time as balancing the

124. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79 (2d ed. 1994); see MILLS, supra note 2, at 19.
125. See Alex Mills, Variable Geometry, Peer Governance, and the Public International
Perspective on Private International Law, in PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
(Diego P. Fernández Arroyo & Horatia Muir Watt eds., forthcoming 2014).
126. See id. for further discussion of this issue, and of the potential role of the idea of “peer
governance” in explaining the international systemic functioning of private international law.
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interests of private parties against the individual and collective interests of
states, grappling in its own way with what is perhaps the central issue
facing the international legal order as a whole. An important part of the
idea and identity of private international law which emerges from this
analysis is that it should therefore not just be viewed as a set of rules for
solving disputes. As a regulatory technique for coordinating diversity and
for managing and supporting pluralism, it can and should be part of the
legal response to the practical problems of our globalized world, alongside
and in partnership with the universalist techniques and aspirations of public
international law.

